Mexico's oportunidades program fails to make the grade in NYC by Brett W. Fawley & Luciana Juvenal
10   The Regional Economist  |  July 2010
E d u c a T i o n
N
ew York City Mayor Michael Bloom-
berg announced in March that his 
city would not be extending the program 
Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards.  Aimed 
at alleviating the burden of poverty among 
the city’s most disadvantaged citizens, the 
privately funded conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) program was introduced in Septem-
ber 2007 as the first comprehensive initiative 
of its kind to be attempted in the developed 
world.
1  Three years later, the program that 
many, including the mayor, had hoped 
would compete for public funding is instead 
scheduled to end in August.  
Meanwhile, in Mexico, the CCT program 
that directly inspired its New York cousin is 
widely considered a success.  Fourteen years 
ago, Oportunidades (then PROGRESA) 
initiated cash payments to 300,000 impov-
erished rural families for actively managing 
their health and keeping their children in 
school.  Today, having survived multiple 
political regimes, the program provides 
direct cash support to 5 million poor Mexi-
can families (86 percent from rural areas)  
at an annual cost of $3.62 billion.
The overarching objective and means of 
achieving that objective were the same in 
both programs: impede the intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty by use of 
CCTs.  Cash today lessens the strains of 
poverty immediately; conditions imposed 
on the receipt of that cash force investment 
in “human capital,” ideally lessening future 
dependence on the state.  To infer that 
Opportunity NYC failed due to fundamen-
tal differences between rural poverty in 
Mexico and urban poverty in the United 
States, however, neglects that—beyond 
name, objective and CCTs—the programs 
themselves were fundamentally different.  
The purpose of this article is to clarify why 
the programs must be considered indepen-
dently and to highlight one story that the 
data from Opportunity NYC told.
2
Oportunidades: Enabling
Each year, teenagers around the globe 
drop out of school not because they fail to 
appreciate the opportunities education offers 
but because they cannot afford the invest-
ment.  The economic concept of opportunity 
cost, which captures the mutually exclusive 
nature of decisions, permits this even when 
school is free.  In developing countries such 
as Mexico, where compulsory education and 
child labor laws exist but are poorly enforced, 
the opportunity cost of education (not earn-
ing a wage) is often prohibitively high for 
the poor.  Original survey data collected by 
Oportunidades demonstrates this.  As late as 
11 years of age, 92 percent of the rural Mexi-
can children who were surveyed were still 
in school.  By 15, that number dropped to 39 
percent, and by 17 it was 26 percent.  Where 
did they go?  At 11 years of age, 4.26 and 
1.69 percent of boys and girls, respectively, 
reported being employed.  By age 16, those 
numbers were 48.65 for males and 13.22 
percent for females.
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The Oportunidades program was designed 
to address the financial constraints prevent-
ing students from continuing their educa-
tion.  Every two months, eligible mothers of 
students with attendance of at least 85 per-
cent received a cash subsidy.  This subsidy, 
compensating for approximately 40 percent 
of the child’s lost wages, increased with age 
and earning power, an acknowledgement of 
the root cause of dropping out.
Of the 506 very similar poor rural com-
munities initially selected to receive the 
benefits of the program, eligible families 
in 320 randomly chosen communities 
were designated to receive the first round 
of benefits in 1998.
4  Immediately, the 
“treated” villages saw a statistically signifi-
cant increase in enrollment compared with 
the “control” villages, which did not receive 
cash subsidies.  The percent of 14-, 15- and 
16-year-olds enrolled in school increased by 
16, 5 and 6 percent respectively.
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The potential for CCTs to positively influ-
ence school drop-out rates is not confined  
to the developing world.  British and Aus-
tralian programs that offered financially 
eligible students regular cash payments 
for staying in school are credited with an 
average four percentage point increase in 
the proportion of low-income students 
maintaining post-compulsory enrollment.  
The full impact is not completely ascrib-
able to drawing employed students back to 
school (estimates are that two-thirds of the 
increase in U.K. enrollment is attributable to 
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nonetheless offer strong evidence that CCTs 
structured similarly to those of Oportuni-
dades can make a difference in developed 
countries.
Opportunity: Incentivizing
The New York CCT program imme-
diately diverged from Oportunidades by 
reinterpreting the conditions attached to 
cash transfers.  Cash was used to incentiv-
ize achievement, not enable participation.  
Payments were made for attending school 
more than 95 percent of the time ($25-$50 
per month), earning enough high school 
credits in a year to graduate on time ($600) 
and passing standardized tests ($300-$600), 
among other accomplishments.
As indicated by the decision not to conti- 
nue the program, the early numbers released 
in March fell short of expectations.  Across 
elementary, middle and high school, stu-
dents enrolled in the program showed no 
statistically significant increase in achieve-
ment on average.  This does not mean, how-
ever, the incentives had no effect.  Among 
high school students, who would have been 
most motivated by virtue of receiving cash 
payments directly, the fraction of students 
attempting 11 units (the number required 
for on-time graduation) and taking Regents 
Exams (students must pass at least five 
to receive a diploma) grew at statistically 
significant rates.  The accompanying table 
reveals that the incentives’ failure was not 
at getting people to try, but rather at getting 
them to consistently achieve. 
Standardized test results from eighth grade 
allowed researchers to identify ninth-graders 
whom they termed “academically prepared.”  
Compared with their equally prepared peers 
not in Opportunity NYC, an additional 8.9 
percentage points of these students earned 
11 or more credits.  A 7.5 percentage point 
increase in the number of “prepared” fresh-
men passing at least one Regents Exam also 
occurred (not in the table). 
There are two major conclusions to draw.  
First, independent of whether one believes 
in the appropriateness of external incentives 
in school, not all capable students are reach-
ing their full potential without them.
6  The 
ability of adolescents to recognize the full 
benefits of education on their own may be 
limited, and there is room even among the 
capable to improve performance.  Second, 
and far more pressing, a great majority of 
underprivileged adolescents in New York 
outright lack the resources necessary for 
achievement.  Without improving the edu-
cation offered by schools or providing  
a support system for students beyond 
financial incentives, Opportunity NYC 
had an impact on “academically prepared” 
students that compares favorably with the 
accomplishments of whole-school reform 
movements such as the Talent Development 
Model and First Things First.  Unfortunately,  
however, only a third of the student popula-
tion meets this description.  If the data 
accurately represent that the incentives were 
large enough to influence effort school-wide, 
then the implication is that by middle school 
a pronounced ability gap exists even within 
socioeconomically disadvantaged students. 
Luciana Juvenal is an economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/juvenal/ for more on her 
work.  Brett Fawley is a research associate at 
the Bank.
E n dno t E s
  1  Beneficiaries of CCTs receive direct cash 
payments in return for taking specific actions 
to improve their general health and earning 
potential.
  2  Although this article is confined to the educa-
tional aspects of the New York and Mexican 
programs, both are comprehensive programs 
designed to holistically address the causes 
and consequences of poverty.  The original 
name of the Mexican program, PROGRESA, 
is a Spanish acronym for health, nutrition and 
education.  Our focus on education reflects 
that both programs’ long-term goal was to 
break the cycle of poverty, and education is 
widely viewed as essential to this cause.
  3  This number misrepresents that enrollment 
dropped more precipitously for females than 
males.  Presumably, many additional females 
were engaged in informal and unpaid house-
hold work.  It’s also likely that they perceived 
lower gains from education than their male 
counterparts did. 
  4  Limited resources precluded an immediate 
full rollout.  The others would be included in 
the program in 2000.
  5  The large increase for 14-year-olds reflects 
the critical transition from primary school 
to secondary school.  The smaller number 
of secondary schools often meant traveling 
longer distances to attend, further discouraging 
enrollment.
  6  See Angrist and Lavy, as well as Jackson, for 
examples of other programs that reported  
success from financially rewarding students.
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Academically Prepared Academically Unprepared
% Attempting % Earning % Attempting % Earning
Control Group 91.6 68.8 84.9 47.1
Program Group 95.7 77.6 90.5 43.6
Difference 4.1** 8.9** 5.6*** –3.5
Effect on 9th-Graders Attempting and Earning 11 or More Units in the First Year of Opportunity NYC
Source: MDrc calculations using data from new york city Department of education administrative records 
noTeS: ** and *** represent statistically significant differences between the control group and the program group at the 5 percent and 1 percent significance 
levels.  “academically prepared” ninth-graders are defined as those students who were deemed proficient in math on their eighth-grade standardized tests. 
results are qualitatively the same when proficiency in english is used instead. 
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